

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CU-02 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 IO-10

CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01

SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 H-02 NSC-05 OMB-01 EB-07

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R 141855Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2226

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
USMISSION USBERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 21091

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, FR  
SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT: FRENCH REACTION AND FOLLOW-UP

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: FRENCH WERE GENERALLY SATISFIED THAT HELSINKI SUMMIT MARKED MORE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF CSCE THAN SOME SKEPTICS HAD THOUGHT POSSIBLE. THEY BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE PROVISIONS SHOULD BE LARGELY A MATTER FOR BILATERAL DIPLOMACY, ALTHOUGH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE A ROLE FOR NATO IN THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION. FRENCH OPPOSE, HOWEVER, CONCEPT THAT NATO SHOULD HAVE AN ACTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN COORDINATING IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE PROVISIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. WE MET WITH ANDREANI (QUAI DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) ON AUGUST 12 TO DISCUSS FRENCH REACTION TO CSCE SUMMIT. ANDREANI (WHO WAS WITH FRENCH DELEGATION TO NATO IN EARLY DAYS OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON CSCE, THEN RETURNED TO QUAI TO HEAD THE CSCE OFFICE AND ITS CSCE DELEGATION IN GENEVA) IS PARTICULARLY KNOWLEDGABLE SENIOR QUAI OFFICIAL DEALING WITH CSCE. HE SAID THAT FRENCH WERE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH RESULTS OF HELSINKI SUMMIT. IN EARLY DAYS OF CSCE NEGOTIATIONS, SAID ANDREANI, FEW EXPECTED THAT CBM'S AND THIRD BASKET WOULD HAVE MUCH SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT. TO THE SURPRISE OF MANY SKEPTICS, CONTINUED ANDREANI, BOTH SUBJECTS SHOWED SUBSTANTIVE GAINS FOR THE WEST AND PARALLEL CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE BY THE EAST AT HELSINKI. WHILE FRENCH ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT OVERALL BEHAVIOR OF SOVIETS IS LIKELY TO CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE CSCE PROVISIONS, ANDREANI THOUGHT THAT RESULTS OF SUMMIT WERE MORE POSITIVE THAN GENERALLY PICTURED IN SKEPTICAL REPORTING BY CONFIDENTIAL

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3. IN ANALYZING SUMMIT ITSELF, ANDREANI SAID THAT -- WHILE PHASE III COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A "SUCCESS" FOR THE SOVIETS -- SPEECHES BY BREZHNEV AND OTHER EE LEADERS AT HELSINKI SHOWED THAT THEY WERE "MORE OR LESS" ON THE DEFENSIVE. TONE OF SOVIETS THROUGHOUT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS NOT SUCH AS TO MAKE IT APPEAR TO BE A GREAT

SOVIET "VICTORY." ON THE CONTRARY, THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE PRUDENT, EVEN MODERATE. THE ONLY OFFENSIVE POINT -- ACCORDING TO ANDREANI -- WAS SOVIET PUBLIC INSISTENCE ON "REGIONAL DISARMAMENT" -- A CONCEPT WHICH PRODUCES ALL SORTS OF NEGATIVE VIBRATIONS ON THE FRENCH SIDE.

4. WITH REGARD TO HELSINKI FOLLOW UP, ANDREANI SAID THAT THE GOF BELIEVES THAT THE MULTILATERAL PHASE OF CSCE IS OVER. ACTION SHOULD BE FOCUSED IN THE FUTURE AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL. CONSEQUENTLY, A MAIN THEME OF GISCARD'S TRIP TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER WILL BE THE APPLICATION OF CSCE PROVISIONS TO FRANCO-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. ANDREANI ADDED THAT THE FRENCH SEE NO ACTIVE ROLE FOR NATO OR FOR THE EC-NINE IN IMPLEMENTING THE CSCE PROVISIONS. ELABORATING ON THIS POINT, ANDREANI SAID THAT CERTAIN OF THE CSCE PROVISIONS WERE "AUTOMATIC" I.E., SELF-IMPLEMENTING. THE BULK OF THE PROVISIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS WHERE EACH COUNTRY SHOULD FOLLOW "ITS OWN PATH" FOCUSING ON THOSE ELEMENTS MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVING IT. FOR EXAMPLE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 21091

THE GOF MIGHT EMPHASIZE FOLLOW-UP OF CULTURAL ASPECTS OF CSCE PROVISIONS, WHILE THE U.S. AND THE FRG MIGHT EMPHASIZE THE TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS. ANDREANI ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE COULD BE SOME LIMITED FOLLOW-UP ROLE FOR MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNESCO AND ECE. ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A ROLE FOR NATO IN EXCHANGING INFORMATION CONCERNING PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING BILATERAL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE AGREEMENTS, HE WAS ADAMANT THAT NATO SHOULD NOT HAVE AN ACTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING CSCE PROVISIONS.

5. AS IF TO UNDERLINE THE FRENCH POLICY THAT CSCE IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON TRADITIONAL BILATERAL DIPLOMACY, ANDREANI SAID THAT THE SEPARATE CSCE OFFICE IN THE QUAI WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DISSOLVED AND

THAT THE QUAI'S EASTERN EUROPEAN OFFICE (WHICH WORKS UNDER ANDREANI) WOULD BECOME THE HUB OF FRANCE'S EFFORTS TO PUSH CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. THIS WOULD NOT EXCLUDE, HOWEVER, CERTAIN SUBJECTS BEING HANDLED BY OTHER QUAI OFFICES (E.G., CBM BY THE OFFICE OF PACTS AND DISARMAMENT).

6. COMMENT: WHILE ANDREANI MAY HAVE SLIGHTLY EXAGGERATED FRENCH OPPOSITION TO ACTIVE NATO ROLE IN COORDINATING EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE PROVISIONS (E.G., FRENCH PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVE NATO COORDINATION OF CBM ASPECTS OF AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISE SERIES) WE EXPECT THAT THRUST OF HIS COMMENTS IS ACCURATE REFLECTION OF CURRENT GOF ATTITUDE AND THAT FRENCH WILL RESIST NATO ROLE OF ACTIVE LEADERSHIP IN COORDINATING ALLIED (AT LEAST FRENCH) ACTIONS DURING CSCE FOLLOW-UP. AT THE  
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SAME TIME WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THE FRENCH WILL POSE ANY SERIOUS OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG NATO MEMBERS WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK CONCERNING BILATERAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT CSCE PROVISIONS.  
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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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